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This article examines the relation between global space
and citizenship by examining the cases of WTO meeting
and Hong Kong Disneyland. Scholars assert that global
space can unsettle naturalised social relations. Yet, an
ambiguous and vague sense of citizenship and a neoliberal
spatiotemporal frame constrain how the state, the media,
and the locals interpret the meanings of space, and how
citizenship is manifested in space. In the global space of
the WTO meeting and the Hong Kong Disneyland, the
Hong Kong Chinese identity is reinforced by demonising
South Korean farmers and mainland Chinese.
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Introduction
An increasingly integrated global economy has problematical space (Harvey
1989) just as the industrial revolution has problematical time. Advancement in
new information and communication technologies is believed to conquer space
and to accelerate economic transaction. The global financial market relies on
telecommunications to survive; “just-in-time” production and outsourcing take
advantages of space erosion for a 24-hour production cycle. Business executives
negotiate virtually through teleconferencing and e-mail. Cable television and the
Internet create a virtual space for consumers to shop and to indulge in a consumer
lifestyle fantasy. Airlines, international hotel chains, global media and entertainment companies work hard to ensure world travellers never leave luxury comfort
even when they are on the road.
Nevertheless, the access to space and the right to claim space is uneven. Whilst
the aﬄuent global north is not bounded by a geographical area, the global south
is locked in a local area. The mobility of the global south is often questioned and
scrutinised by lawmakers and the media. Laws and regulations deny the homeless,
protestors and immigrants the right to space (D’Arcus 2006; Jameson 1998).
Critical scholars from cultural studies and political economy lament the increasingly privatised world dominated by transnational corporations. Public space
from park to community radio, from arts and cultural venue to commercial-free
Internet become more scarce. The state increasingly sees citizens as consumers
who are vital to the economy. It is not surprising that Americans were urged to
shop to show patriotism after the Sept 11 attack. Scholars and activists argue that
citizenship will only flourish in public space, be it community media, public park
or knowledge commons.
However, it is questionable if the provision of public space automatically leads
to a stronger sense of citizenship. First, the concept of citizen implies universalism – that citizens have the same desires and needs. Cultural particularities are
not taken into account in the undiﬀerentiated citizen concept. As a result, gender,
racial, ethnic, cultural and religious identities submerge under citizenship (Young
1990; 1994). The practice of citizenship has always excluded racial minorities, the
oppressed class, and the economically disadvantaged (Roche 1994; Taylor 1994;
Turner 1994; Croucher 2003; Heater 2004; Magnette 2005). Locke, Spinoza, Rousseau and Kant all believed that rationality is required for citizenship; hence, they
disqualified women, minority groups, slaves and the poor as citizens.
Second, there is an assumption that citizens themselves understand their rights
and obligations and that they find citizenship meaningful. The disengagement
from citizenship is not merely due to a lack of education; it is a result of voluntary
or forced migration, colonisation and decolonisation, oppression, marginalisation,
war and state violence, privatisation of common goods, and commercialisation of
the state and the media.
Third, the availability of and the access to space do not lead to citizenry if
a neoliberal spatiotemporal ideology constrains citizens’ imagination of space.
David Harvey argues in Justice, Nature and the Geography of Diﬀerence (1996) that a
hegemonic spatiotemporal frame is a meta-narrative of postmodernity; this dominant ideology of time-space relation has to be understood through examining the
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historical materialist nature of how time and space are constructed. To Harvey
(1989), globalisation is a spatial problem, a “spatial fix” is thus employed to absorb
excessive labor and capital.
The boundary between public space and private space is increasingly blurred.
For example, the international coﬀee chain Starbucks has successfully created a
pseudo-public space in a private space. Patrons can sit in the coﬀee shop without
interference from the staﬀ. The Starbucks experience probes public libraries to be
more like a private operator by oﬀering beverage service and plush sofas. The blurring of the boundary not only allows the state to gather revenue from corporate
sponsorship, it also helps corporations to appear more like a public service.
Because the concept of citizenship has the potential to suppress minority interests and it may not be meaningful to all citizens, the state and corporations can
exploit the term “citizen” to achieve their political economic goals. To most people
living in developed countries (and arguably in developing countries), they may
have diﬃculty to recite how their citizens rights are protected by the laws. Yet they
may have little problem with reciting some recent TV advertisements. After all,
being a consumer is a more tangible experience than being a citizen. Money, not a
particular gender, race, or ethnicity, is all one needs to be a consumer. Values such
as success, sex appeal, love, family used in advertisements resonate with consumers more than abstract concepts such as equality and democracy.
Given the above three assumptions about citizenship and space, it is desirable
to examine the process of how citizenry is constructed by the state, corporation,
and citizens in a local setting (Jones and Garento 2002; Lister et al. 2005). Citizenry
has to be articulated and negotiated in space. The meanings of citizenship change
when the meanings of space change. Specifically, this paper looks at the construction of citizenship in a constructed global space – defined here as a strategic site
(usually a city) that accumulates global investment. Bauman (1998) characterises
global capital as “footloose,” it flows to where profit is. A neoliberal spatiotemporal
order constrains how social actors experience space and how they make meanings
of it. Global space attracts both highly paid executives as well as the global underclass (Isin and Wood 1999; Sassen 2001). The influx of workers, tourists, business
executives to a dynamic, fluid, ever-changing global space probes social actors to
renegotiate social relations (Harvey 1989; Massey 2005).
As a global city, a Special Administrative Region of China, and a former British
colony, Hong Kong provides many examples to show how the state actively builds
global space to attract global capital after decolonisation. The question of the Hong
Kong Chinese identity has interested scholars prior to and after the handover in
1997. Yet few have examined how the changing meanings of space relate to the
construction of the Hong Kong Chinese identity. The two events that illustrate
the construction of citizenship in a global space are the Sixth WTO Ministerial
Conference in 2005 and the construction of the Hong Kong Disneyland. In the case
of the WTO meeting, the arrival of international delegates and protestors could
have probed the locals to rethink what public space means and how citizenship
is created in space. However, the media interpret the meanings of space with a
capitalist spatiotemporal ideology. In the case of Hong Kong Disneyland, both the
state and the Disney Corporation justified the construction of the park by replacing
the concept of citizen with consumer. Both instances of global space have opened

up questions of citizenship, race, and ethnicity in a local setting. Rather than confronting issues related to the Hong Kong Chinese identity, race, and ethnicity in
the global economy, the local media opted to single out South Korean farmers and
mainland Chinese as villains who threatened the Hong Kong economy and the
Hong Kong Chinese identity.
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The Hong Kong Chinese Identity, Colonial Place,
Postmodern Space
In order to attract global capital, states and cities have to develop strategies to
stay competitive in the global economy. The astonishing economic development of
the four Asia’s little tigers is viewed as model examples that developing countries
can follow to survive the economic globalisation. A locally situated analysis is
needed to examine how the state has historically justified political and economic
arrangements through the discourse of citizenship. The sense of citizenship that
has been constructed is hardly an inclusive concept. To these days, there is no satisfactory Chinese term for the concept of Hong Kong citizens. In Chinese, “Hong
Kong people” and “Hongkonger” are the two closest but unsatisfactory terms.
This paper uses the term “Hong Kong Chinese” because, as will be argued below,
the citizen concept is racially and ethically exclusive. Precisely because there is
no Chinese term for Hong Kong citizen, the state, the media and the locals have
reinvented the Hong Kong Chinese identity to fit their goals, particularly during
political and economic unstable times.
When Hong Kong was annexed as a British colony in 1842, there was no “Hong
Kong Chinese” – there were Chinese (as a race) and Westerners. Although most
Westerners were British, the ambiguous Chinese term “sea people” was used rather
than British. In the first hundred years of colonisation, Hong Kong was a fluid
space. Westerners came to Hong Kong to govern, to trade, and to preach. Chinese
moved across the border between Hong Kong and mainland China freely. There
was no active government programme to establish Hong Kong as a home for both
Westerners and Chinese.
Turner and Ngan (1995) argue that the Hong Kong Chinese identity was
manufactured and imposed upon the population by the colonial government in
the 1960s. It was essential to create a place, a permanent home, for Hong Kong
Chinese. Students underwent a colonial education learned that Hong Kong is an
“east-meets-west, international city.” Hong Kong Chinese, as the locals call themselves, were described in government literature as westernised Chinese who follow
Chinese traditions but enjoy western modernity.1
The “Star Ferry Riot” in the sixties was reckoned to be the incident that alarmed
the colonial government that communist-backed groups may cause social unrest
and may overturn colonial rules. A dramatic fare hike proposed by the Star Ferry
Company ignited the locals to stage protests against an oppressive colonial regime. The state believed that the protest was supported by communist groups, so
it employed violence to stop the demonstration. Soon after, in order to discourage the locals from identifying with the Chinese Communist Party, the colonial
government designed a Hong Kong Chinese identity for the locals. The state and
the media often use women to represent modernity (Young, 2003; Rajan 2004; on
the case of India). A gendered identity, the “factory girl,” was hence designed: she
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was an economically independent, new woman who laboured to boost Hong Kong
productivity. After work, she enjoyed modern and western entertainment such
as catching a Cantonese film or listening to the Beatles (who were flown to Hong
Kong by the colonial government).
This manufactured notion of “Hong Kong Chinese” is a race/ethnicity-based,
consumer identity. Hong Kong had become a home that could not accommodate
non-Chinese. Non-Chinese minorities such as South Asians were and still are
treated as foreign subjects – even though some of them have lived in Hong Kong for
generations. British and other western nationals were seen as the superior “Other”
whilst Indians and Filipinos were treated as the inferior “Other.” By designing the
Hong Kong Chinese identity, the state has successfully used race and ethnicity to
reduce locals’ hostility towards the colonial government by oppressing the nonwhite, racial/ethnic minorities. Race is used by the state to achieve political ends
(Cynthia Enloe cited in Croucher 2003; Abah and Okwori 2005).
The Hong Kong Chinese identity campaign was clearly a successful one. By the
1980s, this identity was portrayed in popular culture and government literature
as a modern, westernised, English-Cantonese bilingual who lives a fast life in the
hustle-bustle of the skyscraper city. This Hong Kong Chinese is unlikely to be fluent in Mandarin, nor is she knowledgeable of Chinese politics and contemporary
culture (incidentally, Chinese history textbooks curiously left out any mention of
the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party). This Hong
Kong Chinese is fearful of the communist regime yet she has an abstract notion of
Chinese nationalism (Teo 1997). On the other hand, she is not a patriot of Britain
and is indiﬀerent to British culture and politics. The ambiguous identity is best
illustrated by Hong Kong Chinese’s support of the Chinese team at Olympic but
of the English football team at the World Cup. The consumer lifestyle that Hong
Kong Chinese led diﬀerentiated them from mainland Chinese, who at that time
still lived in a relatively closed-door Communist China. The Hong Kong Chinese
identity epitomises what a postmodern identity ought to be – fragmented, hybridised, consumerist, popular culture-oriented, ever changing, and amnesic of history
(Abbas 1997; Stokes and Hoover 1999).
The process of decolonisation had created a context for Hong Kong Chinese to
question the permeability of Hong Kong as a home. The Beĳing Massacre in 1989
and the Sino-British negotiations of the city’s future stirred up heated debate about
the implications on citizenship. A tangible colonial place that had been the “home”
of Hong Kong Chinese has suddenly transformed into a liminal, intangible space
of uncertainty. Massey (2005) writes that place is often seen as closed and coherent; as “home” or a secure retreat. Space, on the other hand, is an open field full of
possibilities but uncertainties. Beĳing’s refusal to implement a democratic political
system and its employment of violence on June Fourth intensified the uncertainty
and fear among Hong Kong people. Since the commencement of the Sino-British
negotiations in 1984, the well-to-do and the professional class hurried to emigrate
to Canada, the US, Australia, and the UK for a more certain future in a place that
would not dissolve into space. Although Deng Xiaoping promised “fifty years no
change” after the handover, the Hong Kong homeland would gradually dissolve
into her motherland China, which is made alien to Hong Kong Chinese both politically and economically.

On the British side, fearing the arrival of a few millions Hong Kong-born Chinese,
the British Government ruled them to be naturalised British nationals (overseas),
BN(O) in short, who have no rights to abode in the UK. BN(O) is space-bound and
time-bound; it cannot be passed on to the next generation. The BN(O) status is only
an indication that one is born in a British colony, it does not guarantee any citizen
rights under British laws. When Hong Kong ceased to be a colony, BN(O) became
a memory, an identity of the past.
In order to curb the uncertainty that Hong Kong people felt towards the dissolving homeland into space, the government teamed up with entertainers to run
a “Hong Kong is my home” campaign. Canclini (2001) and Croucher (2003) both
agree that citizenship is a sense of emotional belonging and it provides a sense of
diﬀerence. Home is a powerful metaphor for a private, enclosed space for one to
develop an emotional attachment.
A decade after Hong Kong became the Special Administrative Region (SAR)
of China, the city-sate government, the PRC, and the locals still attempt to determine what Hong Kong is to China, and what China is to the world. An integrated
global economy has impacted nation-states of diﬀerent sizes and diﬀerent political systems. To examine the transformation of Hong Kong as a space governed by
neoliberal economic rules, it is essential to take into account both the transforming
political economic power of China and the Chinese Central government’s determination to show the world the feasibility of “one country, two systems.”
As a small city-state, Hong Kong has to re-invent its narrative for both the local and the global audience to survive the economic globalisation. Facing the rise
of Shanghai as an international city, and neighbouring Shenzhen as a gigantic
export processing and a special economic zone, the Hong Kong SAR government
reinvents Hong Kong as an “Asia’s world city.” Abbas would call it a déjà disparu
identity: “what is new and unique about the situation is always already gone, and
we are left holding a handful of cliches, or a cluster of memories of what has never
been” (Abbas 1997, 23). This newly designed identity reinforces the postmodern,
hypercommercial, and capitalistic nature of colonial Hong Kong. The geographical locale that Hong Kong identifies with is Asia, a vast continent that is culturally
diverse. Whilst China is a political economic entity that is confined to a nation-state
boundary, Asia is an imagined region constructed by the West during the colonial
era. Hong Kong’s former self, an international city is a physical meeting place for
diﬀerent nationals; Hong Kong’s present self, a world/global city, on the other hand,
is imagined to be a boundaryless space that serves as a node for the flow of capital,
personnel, technologies, culture, and ideas. The identity “Asia’s world city,” more so
than the former colonial self “an east-meets-west international city,” erases cultural
and political attachment to China. According to Sassen (2001), global cities connect
to each other more than to their respective states. The reference points that Hong
Kong chose are not China, but Shanghai, Beĳing, Singapore, Taipei, and possibly
Tokyo. In order to prove that Hong Kong is indeed a world city, the SAR government accommodated two visible global power—the WTO and Disney.
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The Freedom-Loving Capital
The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference took place in Hong Kong in 2005. To both
its supporters and critics, the WTO represents a global power in international trade.

Given the nature of urban development in the context of Hong Kong, history
is slowly extinguished, rights are lost, urban space becomes increasingly
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The power locus of the global political economy is “foot loose,” Zygmunt Bauman
(1998) calls it the “bodylessness” of power. The power is not rooted in a place, rather
it flows around space. Nevertheless, neoliberal globalisation in the form of global
talk requires a specific locale to manifest itself. Globalisation manifests itself in an
intensely local setting; yet the contexts are the least local (Appadurai 2001). Similar
to previous WTO conferences, global movements protest at the WTO meeting in
Hong Kong attracted intense local and international media interest. Klein (2004)
claimed that protestors take back the commons by questioning the relations between
citizenship and space by occupying public place. However, most local residents
experienced the WTO protest from news outlets. The media interpret what space
means, and how citizenship is experienced in a global space.
Literature on the relationship between the media and social protests has provided a rich foundation upon which the media coverage of mass demonstration
can be studied. Most studies assert that the media frame social protests as events
of news values, and that organisational norms and practices govern the news
frame (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). At the same time, the media utilise tactics to
present themselves as objective, detached, and neutral (Gitlin 1980; Hackett 1993;
Hertog and McLeod 1995). Local media coverage of the WTO protest used a lot of
commonly-recognised news values2: oﬃcial sources (Gitlin 1980; Kim 2000; Chen
2005); elite interests (Gitlin 1980; Hackett 1993; Small 1994; Hertog and McLeod
1995; McLeod 1995; Undrakhbuyan 2005); violence (Gitlin 1980; Hackett 1993; Small
1994; Martindale 1989; McLeod 1995; DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Kruse 2003); deviance (Gitlin 1980; Shoemaker 1984; Hackett 1993); sensational elements (Gitlin 1980;
Hertog and McLeod 1995); and focus on the individuals (Gitlin 1980; Gamson and
Wolfseld 1993; Small 1994; Hertog and McLeod 1995).
Past studies tend not to examine how the media represent space. As institutions
with economic motivations, the media are governed by a neoliberal spatiotemporal
order. For example, evening news is broadcast at a time when the economically active population begins their leisure time in a private setting; salient news items are
allocated with more time; advertising time is sold to generate revenue (Moores 2005).
Not only are news items edited in a capitalistic fashion, the spatiotemporal order
represented in news stories also adheres to the neoliberal economic principles.
Critical scholars agree that public streets and space are common goods: in a
democratic society, citizens can participate in street protests; citizens can gather in
public places for social, cultural and political purposes; citizens have the rights to
feel safe in the streets. In contrast, in a consumer society, the streets are transformed
into shopping and commerce zones where flâneurs stroll, observe, and consume.
Some cities have restricted citizens’ right to use public space. For example, the city
of Seattle has passed a city regulation that prohibits individuals from sitting down
on a sidewalk if not for emergency assistance, rallies, parades, waiting for buses,
or consuming food and beverage in a street cafe (Mitchell 2003). A translation of
this regulation reads: the homeless cannot sit on a sidewalk because they will bring
inconvenience to the locals and the tourists. The homeless citizens’ rights to space
are blatantly denied in an increasingly privatised world. Assessing the urban space
in Hong Kong, Cuthbert and McKinnell stated that:
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subject to surveillance and policing, human activities become restricted and
the public realm loses its clarity as a symbol of civil society (Cuthbert and
McKinnell, 1997: 296).
During the meeting period, the convention venue and its surrounding area were
transformed into a sacred global space. The WTO meeting site at the Hong Kong
Convention and Exhibition Centre was transformed to symbolise a space where
“globalisation is in process.” Broadcast news helped to construct a familiar local
site into a culturally-nonspecific space that represents “global power.” The Hong
Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre is connected to a number of financial
buildings in the area by pedestrian bridges, which are like arteries to the heart. In
order to protect the heart of global economy, the police protected the veins as well.
The vulnerability of this global space was accentuated by the police’s painstaking
security eﬀorts. Similarly, after Sept 11 attack, along with the White House, Disneyland also increased security; McDonald’s and Starbucks, symbols of economic
globalisation, were sites for attack during the WTO protest in Seattle.
In a global space, the global north has the maximum access to space whilst the
mobility of the global south is scrutinised and monitored. The media intensely
scrutinised how protestors (in particular, South Korean farmers) moved around the
city while questioning their rights to visit and to mobility. In contrast to the luxury
hotels where the WTO delegates stayed at and the flashy cars that transported them
to the meeting venue, the media showed the dilapidated city hostels and recreation
houses where the protestors stayed at. The protestors were marginalised spatially
and economically: The media pointed out that the protestors brought along cup
noodles and fruit to Hong Kong. Unlike Disneyland tourists, the media did not
view protesters as tourists who might benefit Hong Kong economically. The media
acted like a prison guard stationed in a panopticon by continuously scrutinising
the “criminals.” The media closely monitored the behaviour of South Korean
protestors – from their napping and exercising in public parks, to the uniforms
and national costumes that they wore during protest. On the contrary, the story
assigned insignificant roles to WTO delegates; EU Commissioner Peter Mandelson
occasionally acted as the talking head to remind the public that the WTO negotiations were indeed in process. The little airtime allocated to WTO delegates seemed
to legitimise the activities inside the convention; hence they needed no monitoring
from the media.
Space of representations made protests visible to the local and the media (Mitchell 2003). Scholars commonly reckon that the media do not report news, but construct reality and represent it as the truth. Although global movements protestors
have become more savvy to use space, their actions are mediated by the media. TV
news constructs protest as exotic, violent spectacle that needs to be surveyed and
monitored. News stations strategically dispersed reporters to a number of public
sites to provide the audience with multiple localities simultaneously. Low angle
shots were commonly used to capture street protests. Insuﬃcient knowledge of
grassroots movements led journalists to interpret for the audience what the protest
tactics meant. A journalist called the protest “carnival-like”; another interpreted
street theatre, performance, and story-telling as entertainment and called them
“music night show” and “cultural show.” The neoliberal spatio-temporal order
has constrained how space is understood and used by citizens. The powerful
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entertainment industry in Hong Kong has naturalised all forms of performance
as consumption and has denied the political agency of the performers. In a truly
public sphere, means of expression such as singing, dancing, and acting are practices through which citizens exercise their agency to probe for social change and
collective action.
If the WTO delegates represent the global north and the protestors represent
the global south, then where are Hong Kong people? Sassen (2001) asserted that
global cities provide a space for the global underclass to form coalition. Although
social relations can be reinforced in a global space, the fluidity of global space can
also unsettle naturalised social relations. For example, although few Hong Kong
Chinese are farmers, the working poor can identify with the harsh living condition
of farmers elsewhere. Instead the media downplayed the significance of the fluidity of global space. It encouraged Hong Kong Chinese to seek home – a physical
locale at times of uncertainty. Juxtaposed with what the media called a colourful
march were clips of interviewed citizens who expressed their fear of violence and
their desire to go home. When it is uncertain who has the right to claim space,
home becomes a powerful metaphor for a sense of attachment and belonging. As
discussed, the Hong Kong government told Hong Kong Chinese that Hong Kong
is “our home” during times of political uncertainty.
In order to accommodate the WTO meeting, the Hong Kong government heavily restricted traﬃc in the downtown area. The media highlighted stories about
traﬃc detour, suspension of public services and businesses, and the inconvenience
experienced by the public; only the economically active population was seen as
citizens (Dagnino 2005; Lister et al. 2005). The working public, small business owners
and taxi drivers were used to represent citizens’ voice. The media did not care too
much about how the economically inactive and the marginalised citizens (such as
the homeless) felt about the road blocks. Filipino domestic helpers in Hong Kong
gather in public space on holidays; a restricted downtown area may limit their
rights to gather. However, as the media and the government have long neglected
the citizen rights of this labour class of foreign national, their right to space was
not deemed as an issue.
When asked how the government can help employees to commute to work,
an oﬃcial advised companies to implement flexible workdays for employees, and
advised employees to take annual leave or telecommute from home. To the government, workers’ inconvenience should be subordinate to that of the companies
and Hong Kong productivity. The Hong Kong Chief Executive and the Conference
Chairman both expressed empathy for the Hong Kong people but insisted that citizens need to contribute to Hong Kong’s commitment to free trade. This illustrates
Jameson’s (1998) point that the freedom of capital compromises citizens’ freedom
of mobility. After the WTO meeting, the Chief Executive and various high-level
oﬃcials staged a high-profile PR event for the media. The government expressed
its concerns to aﬀected businesses, and proposed to bus mainland Chinese tourists
to aﬀected areas to stimulate consumption. As will be further discussed in the next
section, mainland Chinese are only granted mobility in the city if they consume.
Some citizens questioned their rights to mobility, but they tended to blame the
protesters and government oﬃcials rather than the WTO delegates. This illustrates
that the most powerful have the privilege to maximum mobility and enjoy a com-

30

mand of space. The government and the media aﬃrm WTO delegates’ legitimacy
as political actors, hence their behaviours and actions were not monitored at all.
Similarly, large companies could choose the sites of operation and control the flow of
labour through renting oﬃce space elsewhere and through demanding employees
for accommodation at the expense of employees’ extra time to commute.
Whilst some Hong Kong Chinese expressed a desire to go home in the disorienting global space (Morley and Robin 1995), others were spectators in global
space. In the majority of news reports, Hong Kong Chinese were represented as
passive onlookers who took pictures and recorded video of the events from outside
the protest areas. The behaviour of the onlookers was not unlike those of Disney
visitors. As will be mentioned in the next section, a consumer society has trained
members to be quiet citizens. Thoroughly trained as consumers, Hong Kong
Chinese view protests as a spectacle like a Disney parade where onlookers can be
passive participants who consume images of no depth. In line with what Baudrillard
wrote about simulacra (Baudrillard 2001), Hong Kong Chinese believe that the images do not represent anything other than the images themselves. This postmodern
understanding of protests epitomises how a neoliberal spatiotemporal order has
masked material relations as symbolic ones.
There were few instances in which the media reported on Hong Kong Chinese
who transcended naturalised social relations. A few sympathetic Hong Kong Chinese expressed pity towards the South Korean protestors. Women were used to
represent the Mother whose love transcends cultural, linguistic, national, racial, and
ethnic boundary: a woman was shown treating South Korean farmers to Cantonese dim sum, and she was quoted as feeling sorry for their economic deprivation.
Another woman told a TV journalist that she has wept after watching the protest.
In both cases, South Korean protestors were reduced to the status of children who
needed to be taken care of by a Mother.
The media have largely neglected Hong Kong Chinese who participated in the
protest as public citizens. The media barely mentioned there were Hong Kong
citizens among the protesters but gave no exact number. A news story showed a
marching local public servant who expressed concerns about the privatization of
the service industry and the potential harm that it would pose to local workers. This
story was not followed up. Furthermore, the media questioned the rationality of two
Hong Kong citizens who joined South Korean farmers waiting to be arrested.
Global space could unsettle naturalised social relations by having the global
north interacts with the global south. In the Hong Kong media coverage of the WTO
meeting, the media sidetracked the relations between the WTO delegates and the
protestors. It instead focused on the relations between the protestors and Hong
Kong Chinese. The antagonising relation is reinforced by the diﬀerence between
South Korean farmers and Hong Kong Chinese in a global space.
Social groups are pitted against one another for economic survival in the global
economy. Factory owners exploit predominately women workers by threatening
that their exploitative jobs will be taken away to another country if they do not accept the long hours and the low pay. American workers are told by politicians that
overseas workers have taken away their jobs. African American workers gradually
find their low-paying jobs have been taken away by Hispanic workers. The race to
the bottom occurs locally, nationally, and globally. In the media coverage of the WTO

Disney Citizens
For many men and women, especially youth, the questions specific to citizenship, such as how we inform ourselves and who represents our interests, are
answered more often than not through private consumption of commodities
and media oﬀerings than through the abstract rules of democracy or through
participation in discredited political organizations (Canclini 2001, 5).
The second case of global space discussed is the construction of Hong Kong
Disneyland. This case is illustrative of how public money was used to build a private, global space in the name of benefitting the public. Ironically, private space
such as Disneyland has become a site that resembles a public space in an increasingly privatised world. Disneyland citizens are those who consume both material
goods and images. Similar to the case of WTO protest, a global space unsettles
social relations. Yet the media seized the chance to reinforce the consumerist ideal
of the Hong Kong Chinese identity while singling out mainland Chinese as clueless consumers.
The innocent discourse of Disney has taught consumers to be quiet citizens who
question little about social relations and regulated practices. Disneyland exemplifies
a neoliberal, global space. Disneyland can be built in any city in the world as long
as the location can attract enough visitors. Regardless of the geographical location,
Disneyland is void of any local reference. Visitors are reminded that they are in
the magic kingdom. The capital that funds Disneyland is footloose. The Disney
Corporation can sell its stakes in Hong Kong Disneyland and charge for management and licencing fees only. Tokyo Disneyland, for instance, is not owned by the
Disney Corporation.
In order to fulfil its ambition to be the Asia’s World City, the Hong Kong government used public money and exploited public trust to reach the business deal with
Disney. Hong Kong Disneyland is a collaboration between the Disney Corporation
and the Hong Kong Government. Disney hopes the amusement park will provide
an avenue for mainland Chinese to learn to be Disney citizens/consumers before
the Chinese Central Government loosens regulations on imported foreign films and
television shows. The Hong Kong Government believes that the park will help to
establish Hong Kong as a global city (Lo 2005). Defending the exorbitant amount
to build the park, the former Chief Secretary Anson Chan said that both Disney
and Hong Kong are internationally well-known brand names, hence one cannot
put a price on Disney choosing Hong Kong as a partner.3
The government paid for 90 percent of the construction costs but it only owns
57 percent of the park. It also has to bear the cost of building a new railroad, public
facilities (such as fire station), and infrastructure (such as highway). At the initial
stage, the government’s astronomical expenditure on the construction and infra-
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protest in Hong Kong, South Korean farmers were singled out as the group that
clogged the flow of money and capital of Hong Kong, and hence the livelihood of
the population. WTO delegates and other proponents of the global economy were not
alleged in the media to be the powerful social actors who decide how the production,
distribution and consumption of goods, wealth and resources should be allocated.
The footloose global capital was not blamed for job losses. Instead, a diﬀerent, alien
group is said to take away the rights to survive from some other groups.
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structure far exceeds the potential profits. The negotiation was hardly democratic;
the public was not informed of the closed doors talk until the agreement was
reached. To defend the question of whether the business deal is fair, the former
Chief Secretary responded that Hong Kong people could assume ownership of the
park. The discourse of “ownership” society asks citizens to realign themselves as
stockholders in a private market in which the individual is a consumer who makes
rational choices about expenditures (Miller 2007). The Financial Secretary further
urged the public to focus on the economic return to the community. However,
some Christian groups doubted if the working class would benefit. Furthermore,
Disneyland employees are subject to some appalling working conditions: short
notice of work schedule, 13-hour workday, unpaid lunch break, inadequate recess
time and rest area.4
As a private space, Disneyland attempts to replicate many remnants of public
space. One of the main attractions Main Street USA is modelled after the town centre
of US Midwest small towns in the early 1900s. Main Street USA was imagined to be
a place where citizens meet and exchange latest news. The daily parade borrows
its concept from Independence Day parade where citizens practise citizenship by
showing patriotism. Regardless of one’s gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, and
age, visitors are treated equally and courteously by staﬀ members. Once visitors
enter the park, they are free to roam around the park without interference. In a
privatised world, it is gradually diﬃcult for citizens to walk in a roomy space that
is safe, clean, and commercial-free. The identical treatment that all visitors receive
may be disguised as equality in a democracy.
Disneyland is constructed as a space where there is no death, no sickness, no
sadness, no terror and no everyday worries (Wasko 2001). Disneyland management
carefully plans how the park is utilised, including how visitors should occupy
space, how they should flow in space, and how much time they should spend in
a particular space.
Disney also controls interpretation of the park by actively rejecting any negotiated and oppositional readings of it. When the mother of this author pointed out the
Saharan animals in the Adventureland are fake, the boat captain replied that they
are actually real. The second time when we took the boat trip, a diﬀerent captain
delivered the same script, but we learned how to answer the questions correctly.
Disney’s ambition is to shape how visitors think, behave, and act in the way
that the company wants them to (Giroux 2000). It wants to turn consumers into
Disney citizens who have a sense of belonging to the Disney world. Not only does
Disney dismiss cultural diﬀerences in meaning-making, the park management also
ignores local laws by refusing to let uniformed food inspectors to enter the park.5
The park is constructed in a remote part of Hong Kong where space is devoid of
any geographical and cultural references. Visitors at Disneyland are not supposed
to believe they are in Hong Kong or China, but in the magical Disneyland. The
Hong Kong Government wanted the park to reflect Chinese culture, but Disney
rejected by arguing that visitors should have a genuine Disney experience (Slater
1999). Disney changed its mind only after the park failed to attract enough mainland
Chinese tourists (Fowler 2008).
In order to ensure the flow of consumers to Disneyland, the Hong Kong government encourages the flow of mainland Chinese tourists to Hong Kong to consume.

33

The Hong Kong Government believed that Disneyland would magically lift Hong
Kong out of economic recession. Encountering the declining number of tourists after
1997, the Hong Kong Government heavily lobbied the Chinese Central Government to relax tourist regulation so that more mainland Chinese could visit Hong
Kong to consume. The Chinese National Tourism Administration abolished the
tourist quota system in 2002 and banks were allowed to exchange foreign currency.
Launched in 2003, “individual visit scheme” (the Chinese name is appropriately
called “freedom walk”) allowed residents in four Guangdong cities to travel overseas without joining a tour group. As of 2006, residents of the entire Guangdong
province and those of 21 cities in other provinces were permitted to travel to 81
countries (the US not being one of them). Hong Kong benefits economically: In
2005, more than half of the 23 million visitors were mainland Chinese; 2.5 million
of them visited Disneyland in the first two months.6 The Hong Kong government
even suggested to the Chinese Central government that special Disney visa could
be granted to mainland Chinese visitors.
The flow of mainland Chinese visitors has an implication on an international
division of labour in a global space, which alters social relations and unsettles the
meaning of Hong Kong Chinese. Locals who work in the tourist industry find
themselves serving mainland Chinese who historically have been seen as a backward, uncivilised, lower class under the colonial “Hong Kong Chinese” discourse.
The consumption power of mainland Chinese tourists is now comparable to, if not
superior to that of tourists from other countries. If consumption power no longer
diﬀerentiates Hong Kong Chinese from mainland Chinese, then what is left of this
constructed identity? Similar to how the media singled out South Korean farmers as the villains who endangered the livelihood of Hong Kong Chinese during
the WTO protest, Disney management and the local media singled out mainland
Chinese visitors as bad citizens. In a private space, a bad citizen is someone who
does not spend enough.
The management feels that mainland Chinese tourists need to modify their
behaviour so that the park can run more. For example, the park found Chinese
tourists spend a lot of time taking pictures, spend little money on souvenirs, and
crowd at the restaurants at the same time. As the park does not understand why,
unlike Americans, mainland Chinese eat lunch only during lunch hours, the management decides education is essential to change visitors’ behaviour. The remedy
is to control imagination (Wasko 2001). The park issues a one-page Chinese guide
instructing tourists how to enjoy Disneyland, and why it is enjoyable (Fowler and
Marr 2006). The company also runs television advertisements in mainland China
explicating how to enjoy Disneyland with family. The advertising executive stated
that the park has to hold the hands of Chinese consumers and tell them what to
expect (Marr and Fowler 2006). Both the Hong Kong Government and the park
hope to familiarise mainland Chinese with Disney by having Disney characters
tour major Chinese cities and by broadcasting TV programmes starring Hong Kong
and mainland pop stars to introduce the theme park.7
The local media reinforce the diﬀerence between mainland Chinese and Hong
Kong Chinese by highlighting the former’s ignorance of consumer lifestyle. For
example, for games that require verbal explanation, visitors can queue at the Cantonese line (for Hong Kong Chinese), the Mandarin line (for mainland Chinese

and Taiwanese), or the English line (for the rest). The media advise the locals to
line up at the English line if the Cantonese one is long because the Mandarin line
is said to be less orderly and civilised. The local media tirelessly contrast the differences between Hong Kong Chinese and mainland Chinese. The former were
portrayed as jaded, sophisticated consumers who are well-versed in the rules of
consumption. The locals compared the Hong Kong park with those overseas and
lamented inadequate space and choices. The mainland Chinese, on the other hand,
were portrayed as clueless consumers who have little respect for civil behaviour
and little regard for personal hygiene. Similar to South Korean farmers during the
WTO protest, the use of space of mainland Chinese in Disneyland is scrutinised.
For example, visitors are not allowed to sit on the sidewalk because this behaviour
is associated with mainland Chinese.
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Returning to Space
Political economists and cultural studies theorists both argue that citizenship
can only be fostered in public space. Yet, it is unknown if public space automatically creates a stronger citizenship. This paper argues that practice of citizenship
has to be understood in a local setting because (1) the concept of citizenship implies
universalism without taking particularities into account; (2) there is an assumption
that social actors understand what citizenship means and find it meaningful; (3) a
neoliberal spatiotemporal ideology governs how space is interpreted.
This paper looks at how the state, the media, and the locals interpret the meanings of space and construct citizenship during the WTO meeting and inside the
Hong Kong Disneyland. Due to British colonisation and then re-unification with
China, the Hong Kong Chinese identity is argued to be a vague and ambiguous
form of citizenship. It is more of a racially/ethnically exclusive and consumerist
identity. Precisely because of its unclear nature, the meanings of citizenship can be
molded by the state, the media, the corporation, and the locals to achieve political
economic purpose.
Scholars have argued that naturalised social relations can be unsettled in global
space, yet global space can also solidify the interests of a particular social group. Facing the changing social relations under an integrated global economy, social groups
often respond by asserting their group rights in the forms of cultural politics, ethnic
identities, local communities, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism (Islin and
Wood 1999; Robertson 1995; Della Porta et al. 2006). The disfranchised population
often looks up to the media to learn who they are as citizens (Croucher 2003).
The cases of the WTO meeting and Hong Kong Disneyland are two illustrative
but diﬀerent examples to show how the state, the media and the locals reinforce the
Hong Kong Chinese identity by demonising the Other – South Korean farmers in
the WTO meeting and mainland Chinese in Hong Kong Disneyland. Appropriating a neoliberal spatiotemporal frame, the media believe space should facilitate a
maximum flow of capital. Therefore when WTO protestors make themselves visible
in public space and when mainland Chinese flout rules in Disneyland, the media
highlighted how these two social groups endangered Hong Kong economy and
the Hong Kong Chinese identity.
Although the cases of WTO meeting and Hong Kong Disneyland are representative of how global space is interpreted and how that interpretation is related

Notes:
1. As someone who grew up in Hong Kong and underwent a colonial education from kindergarten
to graduate school, this section was written from an interpretivist, autoethnographic perspective.
2. The television news examined come from the Chinese channels of the two Hong Kong television
stations TVB and ATV. TVB, in particular, almost monopolies the local television market by owning
80 percent market share of broadcast television. Its status is unchallenged by the underdog ATV
and the newcomer cable television. It is possible that TV audience watch the evening news of
both stations as ATV’s one starts at six and TVB’s half an hour later. WTO-related news from the time
period December 5, 2005-January 2, 2006 were used for the analysis
3. “Chief Secretary for Administration: Hong Kong Disneyland A Sound Investment.” Hong Kong
Government press release. 2 November, 1999.
4. “Transcript of press conference on HK Disneyland project.” Hong Kong Government press release.
November 3, 1999.
5. The daily operation of the park shows how Disney strictly controls the Disneyland image. Soon
after its opening, two uniformed food inspectors who wished to investigate a reported case of food
poisoning were asked to remove their caps and badges to conceal their identities. The local media
later criticised the abuse of power by Disney (“Disney’s hegemony incites public anger” 2005).
6. Market summary (Feb. 2006) – Mainland China. The Network for HK Tourism Partners.
7. Pop stars narrating their love for Hong Kong. Discover Hong Kong. http://www.
discoverhongkong.com/taiwan/tvprogram/index.jhtml. Last access: June 14 2006.
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